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Political reality shows that the "Axis of Evil" is not as strong an alliance as it might seem, notes journalist Orest Sohar. Otherwise, the Yemeni Houthis, loyal servants of Iran, would not have started to attack Russian tankers in the Red Sea.
Iran appeases Muscovy: Iranian proxies attack tankers with Russian oil
Putin's inability to control the situation in the Red Sea and protect the interests of Russian business undermines confidence in the Russian Federation as a powerful state. Iranian ears perk up behind this.
Putin found himself trapped by his own ambitions. The desire to dominate the world stage and undermine the Western world order has led to the creation of a complex network of alliances that do not always act in a coordinated and predictable manner. Since the end of 2023, the Houthis have been attacking ships in the Red Sea. Officially, this is Israel's revenge for the operation in the Gaza Strip, but they say that they attack only those vessels that have ties to Israel or have entered its ports.
In fact, tankers carrying Russian oil, such as the Panamanian-flagged Blue Lagoon I, hit on September 2, or tankers with Russians on board, such as the Greek-flagged Sounion, are increasingly being attacked: Yemeni terrorists even tried to blow it up , scaring environmentalists and vacationers on the Red Sea beaches at the end of August.
The Houthis are part of the so-called Tehran proxy "Axis of Resistance" — an anti-Israeli and anti-Western alliance of regional armed groups (which includes the Palestinian Hamas and the Lebanese Hezbollah). Since the end of 2015, they have controlled most of northwestern Yemen.
An interesting cycle: Iran supplies weapons to Russia and the Yemeni Houthis. The Houthis are “storming” tankers with Russian oil, firing them probably with the same missiles and Shaheds that the Russian Federation receives. And Iran is watching all this.
Tehran took advantage of the situational weakness of the Russian Federation and turned the situation in its favor: by strengthening its influence in the region, the ayatollahs receive political and economic advantages. Attacks on tankers with Russian oil are not only an economic blow to Moscow, but also a signal that it is Tehran that can guarantee security in the Red Sea.
Something suggests that the Russian dictator somewhere tried to pump his influence in the region and "caught" the return. If this is not enough, the Houthis will receive more ammunition and "accidentally" hit more tankers with Russian oil.
It seems that, having ceded China's leadership in that entire dystopia, the Russian Federation is now forced to defend its right to occupy the second step, in particular in competition with Iran: Tehran is interested in creating its network of influence in the Middle East. It would seem that the strategic goals of both states currently coincide, but this does not mean that they are united in their tactical approaches.
